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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 09-3571 
 
FELICIA VITALE;  
LOUIS VITALE,  
 
                         Appellants 
 
v. 
 
CARRIER CLINIC, INC. 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Civ. No. 3-08-cv-03472) 
District Judge: Hon. Freda L. Wolfson 
 
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 8, 2010 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SLOVITER and 
COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 17, 2010) 
 
OPINION 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Felicia and Louis Vitale, wife and husband, appeal from the district court’s  order 
dismissing their medical malpractice action against Carrier Clinic, Inc., with prejudice. 
The court dismissed the complaint because they failed to comply with New Jersey’s 
Affidavit of Merit statute, N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-26 to -29.
1
   For the reasons that follow, we 
                                              
1
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction 
2 
 
will affirm. 
I.
2
 
 The Carrier Clinic filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) contending 
that the Vitales failed to comply with New Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit statute, N.J.S.A. § 
2A: 53A-26 to -29.  
 New Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit statute states in relevant part: 
In any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful 
death or property damage resulting from an alleged act of 
malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his 
profession or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60 days 
following the date of filing the answer to the complaint by the 
defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of an 
appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable 
probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or 
exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject 
of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or 
occupational standards or treatment practices.  The court may 
grant no more than one additional period, not to exceed 60 
days, to file the affidavit pursuant to this section, upon a 
finding of good cause. 
 
N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-27. 
3
   
 “The statute applies to all actions for damages based on professional negligence.”  
Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condominium Assoc., 997 A.2d 982, 985 (N.J. 
2010) (citations omitted).  “The core purpose underlying the statute is to require plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                                                  
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
2
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only as much of the facts and 
procedural history of this case as are helpful to our brief discussion.   
 
3
 New Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit statute must be applied by federal courts sitting in 
diversity.  Chamberlin v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 157 (3d Cir. 2000).   
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to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, in order that meritless 
lawsuits readily could be identified at an early state of the litigation.”  Id. (citation, 
internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).  “Importantly, there is no legislative 
interest in barring meritorious claims brought in good faith.”  Id.  (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).   “Indeed, the legislative purpose was not to create a minefield 
of  hyper-technicalities in order to doom innocent litigants possessing meritorious 
claims.”  Id.  (citation, internal quotation marks and bracket omitted).   
 “Under the statute, an affidavit should be filed within sixty days of the filing of the 
answer.”  Id.  (citation omitted).  “However, if provided within sixty-one to 120 days 
after the answer is filed, the affidavit will be deemed timely so long as (1) leave to file is 
sought and (2) good cause is established.”  Id. (citations omitted).  “Attorney 
inadvertence is considered good cause within that sixty-one to 120-day period.”  Id.  
(citation omitted). 
 “Neglecting to provide an affidavit of merit after the expiration of 120 days has 
different consequences and generally requires dismissal with prejudice because the 
absence of an affidavit of merit strikes at the heart of the cause of action.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).    However “[w]here extraordinary circumstances are present, a late affidavit 
will result in dismissal without prejudice.”  Id. at 986 (citation omitted).   While the New 
Jersey Supreme Court has “yet to define the full scope of extraordinary circumstances as 
an equitable remedy for failure to comply with the statute, [it has held] that attorney 
inadvertence [does not entitle] plaintiff to a remedy of dismissal of a complaint without 
prejudice.”  Id. (citation omitted).   Indeed, “an attorney’s inadvertence in failing to 
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timely file an affidavit will generally result in dismissal with prejudice.”  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
 In an opinion, dated July 31, 2009,  see Vitale v. Carrier Clinic, Inc., 2009 WL 
2390602 (D.N.J. July 31, 2009), the district court explained that Dr. Tedesco was not an 
appropriately licensed person to sign an Affidavit of Merit because he is “not qualified to 
offer an expert opinion as to the professional standards of Carrier Clinic, a psychiatric 
facility,” Id. at *4-6.  The court also explained why Dr. Goldstein’s affidavit of merit was 
untimely,  Id. at *6; why the common knowledge exception did not apply,  Id. at *7-8; 
and  why the Vitales could not establish “substantial compliance.”  Id. at *8-10.   We can 
add little, if anything, to the district court’s analysis and discussion.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the district court substantially for the reasons set forth in the district court’s 
opinion.   
 However, one matter remains.  The Vitales contend that the district court’s failure 
to hold a Ferreira conference constitutes reversible error.  In Ferreira v. Rancocas 
Orthopedic Assocs., 836 A.2d 779, 780-81 (N.J. 2003), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
“require[d] case management conferences in the early stages of malpractice actions  to 
ensure compliance with the discovery process, including the Affidavit of Merit statute, 
and to remind the parties of the sanctions that will be imposed if they do not fulfill their 
obligations.”    
 The Vitales argue that the district court’s failure to hold a Ferreira conference 
constituted error because, had it  had such a conference, the district court would have 
noticed that Dr. Tedesco’s Affidavit of Merit was inadequate and it would have given 
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them ample time to substitute Dr. Goldstein’s Affidavit of Merit in support of their 
claims.   
 The argument is meritless.  Although New Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit must be 
applied by federal courts sitting in diversity,  the Vitales offer no authority for their 
contention that a federal district court sitting in diversity is required to follow case 
management procedures imposed on New Jersey trial courts by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court.  Moreover,  assuming arguendo  that the district court should have held a Ferreira 
conference, the failure to hold such a conference  does not provide the Vitales with any 
relief.   See Paragon Contractors, 997 A.2d at 987 (“[O]ur creation of a tickler system to 
remind attorneys and their clients about critical filing dates plainly cannot trump the 
statute.  In other words, the absence of a Ferreira conference cannot toll the legislatively 
prescribed time frames.”).   
II. 
 For the above reasons, we will affirm the district court. 
 
